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Abstract 
 
According to Hassler (2000), the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) scheme is one of a small 
number of industry standard means for securing Internet e-commerce communications.  Although 
SET potentially offers a high level of security protection for e-commerce transactions, there have 
been a number of criticisms of SET, including of its complexity and cost of implementation.  
These problems have restricted SET implementation and use. However, SET has been 
continuously improved since it was first released in 1997, including the development of a number 
of SET extensions.  This paper assesses how well SET meets merchant and consumer security 
requirements. In addition, this paper also analyses criticisms of SET and considers its future in 
Internet e-commerce security. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
E-commerce is becoming an important means of doing business for many organisations.  In 
addition, it also provides consumers with a convenient way of shopping. For example, consumers 
can make an order via the Internet, which can be much more convenient than conventional 
shopping, (Whiteley 2000). However, unlike other conventional shopping methods, there is no 
face-to-face contact in e-commerce, and significant security issues arise.  Financial fraud is 
arguably an issue of particular concern to e-commerce consumers. Consumers are worried that 
their financial information will be compromised, (Caldwell 2000).  Furthermore, a significant 
number of consumers are concerned about the trustworthiness of their merchants.  As a 
consequence, it is important to have industry standard means for securing Internet e-commerce 
communications. 
 
 There are a small number of standardised means of providing e-commerce security for Internet 
e-commerce transactions.  Of particular practical importance are Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and 
IETF's SSL-based Transport Layer Security (TLS).  SSL and TLS provide data transmission 
security between senders and receivers, (Oppliger 2000, Rescorla 2001) – see figure 1. 
 
 
 Figure 1. SSL process in e-commerce transactions.  
 
An alternative approach is provided by SET, which has been established specifically for 
securing entire transactions (SET 1997a). Probably for pragmatic rather than security reasons, SSL 
is almost always used in preference to SET for Internet e-commerce security, and SET has not 
really taken off.  Ease of installation and cost of investment are arguably the main problems 
restricting the adoption of SET. As a consequence, this paper will evaluate criticisms of SET, and 
assess the future of this industry standard for security. 
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THE ROLE OF SET IN E-COMMERCE 
 
Since e-commerce allows people to place an order via the Internet, there are also several potential 
associated security threats.  Online fraud is arguably an issue of concern to all e-commerce 
participants, including consumers, merchants, and their respective financial institutions.  SET, 
which was invented by Visa (http://www.visa.com) and MasterCard (http://www.mastercard.com), 
is a method to secure entire e-commerce transactions.  SET is arguably able to address several 
categories of fraud in Internet e-commerce transactions. The operation of SET can be explained as 
follows (also see figure 2), (SET 1997a, Stein 1998). 
 
Stage 1. SET initialisation begins after the SET participants (consumer and merchant) have 
exchanged their identities. 
   
Stage 2. The cardholder selects their purchases and submits an order and payment form to the 
merchant server.  Consumer purchase information will be divided into 2 blocks: order information 
(OI) and payment information (PI).  OI will be encrypted using the merchant public key, whereas 
PI will be encrypted using the acquirer public key.  The consumer PC generates a digital signature 
on both OI and PI and sends the signatures along with the encrypted OI and PI. 
 
Stage 3. The merchant receives the encrypted OI and forward encrypted PI to an acquirer via 
payment gateway for payment authorisation.  The payment gateway can decline the transaction 
based on the information received from the merchant. 
 
Stage 4. The acquirer requests payment authorisation from the issuer via the financial payment 
network. 
 
Stage 5. The issuer responds to the payment request to the acquirer via the financial payment 
network.  The acquirer then sends a payment authorisation to the merchant. 
 
Stage 6. The merchant confirms the transaction after having received payment authorisation from 
the acquirer. 
 Stage 7. The merchant requests the acquirer to capture the transactions. 
 
Stage 8. The issuer issues a bill to the cardholder at some time after confirmation of the 
transaction. 
 
 
Figure 2. SET process in e-commerce transactions.  
 
2.1
 
Credit card fraud 
 
SET supports long key lengths for both symmetric and asymmetric encryption, such as triple DES 
and 1,024-bit RSA (SET 1997b).  There is thus no risk of credit card numbers being compromised 
via interception. In addition, even if unauthorised access to a merchant web server occurs, the 
confidentiality of consumer payment information will not be endangered since it is encrypted 
using an acquiring bank public key. Thus SET can prevent credit card fraud arising from 
transmission and storage of sensitive data. 
 
2.2
 
Merchant fraud 
 
In SET, order and payment information are encrypted separately for specific recipients. That is, 
merchant public keys are used to encrypt order information and acquiring bank public keys are 
used to encrypt payment information. Consumers can thus be assured that their credit card 
numbers will not be compromised by a fraudulent merchant. 
 
In addition, to prevent merchants modifying payment details, e.g. to increase the value of a 
sale, as part of SET the consumer PC adds a digital signature to all relevant transaction 
information. 
 
 
 2.3 Consumer fraud 
 
Since the Internet offers no guarantees about the identity of the originator of a transaction, it is 
difficult for merchants to check whether consumers are using stolen credit card numbers to initiate 
transactions. In SET, consumers must authenticate themselves to their local PC by entering a 
password to activate their digital wallet prior to initiating a transaction.  The consumer's PC then 
transmits completed order form and payment instructions to the merchant.  As SET employs 
digital signatures to authenticate the cardholder PC, merchants can verify the legitimacy of the 
cardholder.  This means that the SET scheme can address consumer fraud deriving from misuse of 
credit card numbers. 
 
2.4 Internet fraud 
 
The Internet link between customer and merchant may be subject to manipulation by a malicious 
third party.  The use by SET of digital signatures, as mentioned in Section 2.2, prevents this. 
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ANALYSIS OF SET CRITICISMS 
 
SET has been criticised for a variety of reasons, Hassler (2000), Gruman (1998), Lieb (1999), 
Treese and Stewart (1998).  Some of the most significant criticisms are as follows. 
 
• SET initialisation is complex.  In particular, key pairs need to be established for each 
entity (and public keys certified). 
 
• Interoperation of SET requires special software to be installed by every participating 
entity. 
 
• SET is somewhat inflexible in that, since digital wallets need to be present in the 
consumer PC, performing e-commerce transactions from third party PCs (e.g. in airport 
lounges, Internet cafes, etc.) is difficult.  There is a significant implementation cost for 
merchant and consumer. 
 
• SET has not been widely adopted, and is widely perceived as being ‘dead’. 
 
• The cryptographic complexity of SET makes it too slow for practical use, (Sherif 2000). 
 
We now examine each of these criticisms in more detail. 
 
3.1 The complexity of end-user initialisation 
 
Unlike SSL, in which the use of digital certificates by end users is optional, every SET participant 
needs to obtain a key pair and a digital certificate for their public key, (Stein 1998). This adds 
considerable complexity to the initialisation process of SET for end-users (e-consumers). In more 
detail, a consumer needs to generate his/her own private-public key pair and then submit their 
identity with the public key to the issuing bank.  This transfer needs to happen in a secure way, so 
that the bank knows that the public key has not been modified in transit and comes from the 
genuine account holder.  The issuing bank then digitally signs the public key supplied by the 
account holder to create a digital certificate for the cardholder. The issuing bank must then 
distribute the certificate to the account holder.  This process makes SET-based e-commerce 
initialisation complicated to conduct for both the consumer and the issuing bank. According to 
Lieb (1999, p. 2), “the effort to obtain digital certificates has held up deployment of SET 
technology”. This therefore appears to be one of the main reasons why SSL is almost always used 
in preference to SET for Internet e-commerce security.  This is also supported by Treese and 
Stewart (1998) who argue that although SET cardholder certificates enable cardholder 
authentication, which reduces problems of fraudulent use of credit card numbers, this benefit 
causes more complexity and investment for the cardholder. 
 3.2 Interoperability 
 
The use of SET relies on applications from several different software vendors and trusted third 
parties, such as Entrust Technologies, Globeset, Hitachi, IBM, and VeriSign.  It is therefore crucial 
for these organisations to establish interoperable SET applications.  For example, all major SET 
products, such as digital wallets, EFTPOS (Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale) 
applications, payment gateway applications, and digital certificates, must work together. Problems 
with interoperability between different implementations has delayed the implementation of SET. 
 
Nevertheless, a report on a SET software interoperability test conducted in 1999 (SET 1999c) 
indicates that interoperability problems are gradually being eliminated. This is because many SET 
products have now successfully passed interoperability tests provided by SETCo. By means of this 
testing regime, interoperability issues are gradually being resolved. 
 
3.3 Flexibility 
 
The e-commerce environment should be flexible for consumers, and enable them to place orders in 
a variety of locations including, for example, from homes, workplaces, or even Internet cafes. 
Since SET requires consumers to download a digital wallet to their computers, achieving this level 
of flexibility with SET is clearly problematic. 
 
However, it could be argued that limiting flexibility is an acceptable price for security of 
financial information. Supporting this argument, the use of digital wallets has been extended to 
SSL as well as SET. It also seems that many software vendors are developing and standardising 
digital wallets in order to make it easier for consumers to use them.  For example, the MasterCard 
wallet based on IBM wallet v2.1 (IBM 1999) supports both the SET and SSL protocols. 
 
A recent paper by IBM states that consumers will in future be able to activate their digital 
wallets from any browser, and not just the default browser on their own device. This will be 
supported through the import and export of payment method information using portable secure 
devices including smart cards (IBM 1999).  This will arguably make SET implementations 
significantly more flexible. 
 
3.4 Cost of investment 
 
Because the intention of SET is to secure the entire transaction process, special applications are 
required to implement SET (unlike SSL, which is built into commonly used web software).  Hence 
the cost of implementation is another cause of concern for many e-commerce merchants, (Gruman 
1998). 
 
However, there are potential commercial advantages for merchants adopting SET rather than 
SSL.  This is because, whilst the credit card payment system offers protection to cardholders in the 
event of fraud, this protection does not always extend to merchants. For example, merchants must 
bear the cost of ‘card not present’ chargebacks, (Caunter 2001), and e-commerce transactions 
protected using SSL are classified as ‘card not present’ transactions. By contrast, SET transactions 
are approved as ‘card present’ transactions (SET 1997a), and hence offer merchants protection 
against certain types of losses resulting from fraudulent use of cards. As a consequence, the cost to 
merchants of SET implementation can be offset against an anticipated reduction in costs associated 
with card fraud. 
 
3.5 SET is dead 
 
The fact that SET has been slow to gain acceptance has led many commentators to claim that SET 
is dead – this claim itself presents a barrier to wider acceptance of SET. However, SETCo reports 
that the number of SET users has risen over 300% since 1998.  It is also claimed by SETCo that a 
number of merchants and financial institutions in US, Europe, Latin America and Asia are 
currently using SET as a standard means for securing transactions. These statistics are not 
consistent with the idea that SET is defunct. 
 
3.6 SET is too slow 
 
The low speed and complexity of transactions is another commonly made criticism of SET that 
reduces its attractiveness to both merchants and consumers. It is sometimes stated that SET is very 
slow in comparison with other Internet e-commerce security protocols, such as SSL. This 
statement may be correct if we calculate the performance of SET when implemented using 
conventional techniques. However, according to a comparative performance analysis conducted by 
Gartner Group (1998), there are several implementation approaches that can be used to improve 
the performance of SET.  These include cryptographic hardware acceleration, and elliptic curve 
cryptography.  If these methods are applied to both SET and SSL, the performance of transactions 
is very similar. 
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PROSPECTS OF SET IMPLEMENTATION 
 
In spite of the fact that SET would appear to be one of the most secure payment methods in e-
commerce, significant hurdles still exist to its widespread adoption.  Amongst the various 
difficulties SET presents, two of the most difficult to deal with are the need for the user 
information stored on a consumer PC to be protected, and the problems associated with 
initialisation.  Since SET is based on the use of public key cryptography, there is also a risk of a 
private key being stolen from a consumer PC. In this section we consider how certain of the SET 
extensions may alleviate these problems. 
 
4.1 PIN extensions 
 
Whilst SET incorporates an element of password-based protection of the digital wallet at the 
consumer PC, the level of protection this offers might not be adequate to prevent unauthorised use 
of a credit card. Therefore it would be desirable to use the existing Personal Identification Number 
(PIN) associated with a payment card as an additional means of online cardholder authentication.  
This motivates the extension of the SET protocol to support the online transport of a cardholders' 
PIN. 
 
In the SET online PIN extensions (SET 1999b), PINs are entered via a PC keyboard or a secure 
PIN entry device. As with a debit/credit card terminal in a merchant premises, cardholder 
applications must be able to verify which credit cards require PINs.  In order that control can be 
exerted over the use of PINs, the SET payment gateway certificate can indicate the method of PIN 
entry permitted by the gateway, such as via a PC keyboard or a secure device. It is possible that, in 
some cases, the SET payment gateway certificate will state that no PIN entry methods are 
acceptable. 
 
4.2 Chip extensions 
 
As has already been mentioned, the fact that sensitive consumer payment information is stored in a 
PC and only protected by password authentication is a source of potential threats. In response to 
this issue, there are significant advantages to be gained from combining the SET protocol with a 
smart card (chip card, IC card or ICC) held by the user.  If such a card can hold appropriate RSA 
keys and certificates, then the security issues associated with the digital wallet can be avoided.  
Since debit/credit IC cards conforming to the EMV (named after its inventors Europay, 
MasterCard, and Visa International) industry standard (EMV 2000a) and incorporating such keys 
are already being issued in large numbers, a major opportunity exists to use them to enhance SET 
security. 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Overview of SET chip extensions 
 
The chip extensions to SET version 1.0 (SET 1999a) enable SET to interoperate with IC cards 
conforming to the EMV industry standards. These extensions extend the SET protocol to support 
the transport of IC Card related data (EMV 1999). 
 
In the EMV card authentication scheme, an issuer provides each IC card with its own 
private/public key pair.  Each card will also contain a digital certificate for the card public key, 
signed by the issuer's private key. In addition, issuer public keys are certified by a brand 
Certification Authority (CA), set up by the owner of the card brand (e.g. Visa or MasterCard).  The 
appropriate issuer public key certificate is then put on the card, along with the card public key 
certificate. In addition, the brand CA public keys are loaded into every merchant terminal. This 
then enables a merchant terminal to verify the pair of certificates held by the IC card, which then 
enables the merchant to verify the IC card's digital signature (EMV 2000b). This PKI structure is 
very similar to the PKI used by SET, and the SET chip extensions are designed to allow the EMV 
PKI to be exploited by SET without the need for SET-specific keys to be established at the 
cardholder.  By means of these extensions the complexity of end-user initialisation when 
conducting SET can be eliminated, as there is no requirement for users to generate a key pair and 
apply for digital certificate.  Figure 3 shows the combination of EMV dynamic authentication and 
SET, as specified in the chip extensions, (EMV 1999, SET 1999a). 
 
 
Figure 3. SET/EMV dynamic authentication in e-commerce transactions. 
 
4.3
 
Analysis of the possibility of SET/EMV implementation 
 
Conducting e-commerce with a combination of SET and EMV is currently a little complicated for 
consumers since it requires an additional device (an IC card reader) to be connected to the user PC.  
However, a number of smart card manufacturers are attempting to facilitate the use of smart cards 
by PC owners. 
 
Over and above the efforts of smart card manufacturers, the availability of appropriate smart 
card readers for consumer e-commerce is likely to be enhanced by the FINREAD (Financial 
transactional IC card reader) project.  This project, part of the European Union IST (Information 
Society) programme, is designed to establish a secure smart card reader for use in consumer e-
commerce, including home banking and Internet shopping. The FINREAD specifications (CWA 
2001) provide a high level of security and are designed to support all forms of secure financial 
services transactions, including SET. Furthermore, in terms of compatibility/compliance with 
technical standards for IC cards, it is also claimed by FINREAD consortium that the FINREAD 
ICC reader shall be compatible with the EMV specifications. This provides further support for the 
future growth of EMV/SET as an e-commerce security solution. 
 
FINREAD terminals are expected to be distributed from Europe to other countries and it is 
estimated that the market for readers may exceed 80 million units in Europe.  Consumers will be 
able to purchase smart card readers at low costs without limiting the security and usability of the 
products (CWA 2001).  Hence it is feasible that the IC card reader will become a widely adopted 
PC peripheral. 
 
5 FUTURE OF SET IN E-COMMERCE 
 
From the above analysis of SET criticisms and the use of SET extensions, it would appear that the 
SET system still has a potentially important role to play in securing e-commerce transactions.  
Consumers, merchants, and financial institutions all benefit from the protection of the secure 
environment offered by the SET protocol. The combination of SET and EMV chip cards will be 
particularly beneficial since it addresses both the digital wallet security issues and the complexity 
of end-user initialisation. As a result, the conclusions of this study of the future of SET can be 
summarised as below. 
 
• Whilst SET has been slow to take off, one of the main hurdles to its adoption, namely the 
cost and complexity of initialisation, can be significantly reduced through the use of the 
chip extensions. 
 
• SET interoperability issues are being solved through the use of interoperability testing 
software produced by SETCo. 
 
• SET flexibility issues are being addressed in a variety of ways, including the development 
of portable digital wallets. 
 
• The cost of investment to merchants can be offset against reduced fraud costs. 
 
• SET is not dead, as is often stated – indeed SET is still being developed. 
 
• The speed of SET is comparable of that of other security techniques, given that it is 
implemented in appropriate ways. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
SET is arguably the only currently available scheme for providing security for entire e-commerce 
transactions. Although there are many criticisms of SET, we have shown that all these criticisms 
can be addressed, and that SET still has the potential to overcome the barriers that restrict its 
implementation. In particular the various extensions to SET seem to both enhance its security and 
reduce the complexity of SET implementation. Hence we believe that the SET secure transactions 
method has the potential to be widely used not only in Internet e-commerce security but also in 
other methods of payment where the potential for fraud is of particular concern to the e-consumer. 
 
Although SSL is almost always used in preference to SET for Internet e-commerce security at 
present, implementation of SET in e-commerce may be just a matter of time.  Given potential e-
commerce participants are very concerned about the threat of credit card fraud, cooperation 
between public and private sectors would seem to be a possible enabler for the future adoption of 
this alternative scheme.  One way in which the adoption of SET could be facilitated would be if 
governments or trade bodies positively encouraged merchants and card issuers to adopt SET, e.g. 
by requiring its use for their e-business.  However, for such a move to become reality would 
require a positive decision in favour of SET by official bodies, which seems to be some way from 
reality in the current climate.   
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